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Abstract 
This essay explores the philosophical significance of Anthony Burgess’s 1960s novel A Clockwork 
Orange. Specific themes in this novel are developed through character and situation, in a way 
which takes cognisance of important problems in the history of philosophy. The essay looks at 
two particular themes in this context. The first relates to the epistemological question of the 
distinction between truth and illusion. The novel thematizes the demarcation between truth and 
illusion, or truth and appearance, and raises the issue of whether we can have a knowledge or 
epistemological foundation for such a distinction. Second, the novel addresses a question at the 
heart of ethics, that is, the issue of whether there is a clear distinction between good and evil. 
Moreover, it develops this question in relation to the further issue of the explanation for the 
seeming attractiveness of evil, if good is an acknowledged superior value. In the novel these 
questions are addressed especially through the main character of Alex, whose incarceration and 
rehabilitation treatment by psychiatry comes centre stage. Additionally, the text itself is adapted 
for film by Stanley Kubrick in 1971 and the essay explores how Kubrick’s interpretation of the 
original novel is distinct from that of Burgess (this difference being added to by the medium of 
film). Kubrick’s different interpretation nonetheless builds on the original novel and thus brings 




Yet there was no abrupt transition from “myth” to “philosophy”; one might say that 
the mythic elements retreat before growing rationalisation yet do not disappear. 
– Frederick Copleston: A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome 
If, for Copleston, there is no abrupt revolution from myth to philosophy in the early 
Greek period, we might say that this complicity between mythology and philosophy 
becomes a perennial relationship. In this paper, I will explore some of these curious and 
fascinating interconnections which raise issues of aesthetic provenance but which also 
raise issues of truth and power. In our so-called “post-truth” era, many of these literary 
works seem obsessed with the issues of “truth” and “control,” not only from a literary or 
poetic point of view but also from a political and ethical perspective. Most recently, we 
see the foregrounding of Margaret Atwood’s (Atwood 2019) work as yet another 
example of how such concerns (literary-philosophical but also urgently political) have 
come to the surface in a time of crisis. But extending from the complex dynamics of 
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control and illusion in the Allegory of the Cave, my particular focus will be on Anthony 
Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange.  
Copleston’s declaration of the intersectionality of myth and philosophy finds no 
better and more vivid example than in the works of Plato. There is a great irony in the 
fact that in the sustained dialogue where Socrates appears to advocate the banishment 
of art from the polis, such art is embedded in the very philosophical structure of the 
dialogue form itself, as a form of “representation” or “mimesis.” Indeed, in many ways, 
the philosophical content appears dependent upon the very mythic aspect which is 
supposedly being banished and denied. At the very heart of this Platonic dialogue, The 
Republic, is the complex literary-metaphysical structure of the Allegory of the Cave 
(514a). This is paradigmatic for the discipline of philosophy per se, as Plato is often 
considered the Father of philosophy, with some considering the history of philosophy to 
be “a series of footnotes to Plato.” Thus, this amalgam of philosophy and literature is 
emblematic of a complex relationship between the two domains which will continue to 
develop historically. What is perhaps most striking about this relationship, despite the 
very distinctive aspects of each historical epoch, is the relative continuity in focus which 
we will see equally present even in works of avant-garde authors of the recent past, 
such as Burgess. Themes of knowledge and illusion, of power (control and freedom) can 
be traced from early philosophy right up to the contemporary period, and while these 
problems can be directly addressed through logic and reason, we will be more 
concerned with the more enigmatic exploration of such issues through the lens of 
literary-philosophical myth and fiction. A Clockwork Orange is a subtle and enigmatic 
example of this typology and we have the further example of its development in filmic 
form, in the case of Stanley Kubrick’s cinematic adaptation of Burgess’s 1962 literary 
text in the film version of A Clockwork Orange from 1971 (Kubrick 1971). We will 
explore how the cinema example extends and complexifies some of the philosophical 
and aesthetic issues so central to the original text (McDougal 2003).  
The two main questions we will focus on here are the following: 
1. Is there a clear demarcation between truth and illusion, or truth and appearance, 
and can we have a knowledge or epistemological foundation for such a 
distinction?  
2.  Is there a clear distinction between good and evil? What sense can we make of 
the attractiveness of evil, if good is an acknowledged superior value? 
In each case, we will refer specifically to the literary and cinematic versions of A 
Clockwork Orange as our examples, with reference back to Plato’s Cave as an original 
interpretative framework.  
Exploring the Thematics of Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange 
Our case study here is the example of Anthony Burgess’s novel A Clockwork Orange 
(Burgess 1962/2012). Indeed, this single example is doubled and complicated by the 
fact that its literary text is adapted (but also transformed) in cinema by what becomes 
an even more infamous study than the original novel (Kubrick 1971; McDougal 2003). 
Although both foreground related themes, it has been argued, despite being based on 
the same original narrative, that each of these artistic examples gives us a diametrically 
opposed philosophical answer to the question of freedom and responsibility in a 
contemporary era (Kael 2003, 134ff.) Other interpreters, however, such as Robert 
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Hughes (2003) argue for the “joint imagination” of the two works. One of the most 
interesting questions with regard to the supposed divergence is the rationale for such a 
reinterpretation. Why would Kubrick take the literary narrative into such a different 
filmic direction? Before exploring our two main philosophical questions, we will first 
indicate the main thrust of the original narrative, as well as a key distinction in 
interpretation between the text and film versions. 
The original novel is divided into three main “Parts.” Part 1 sees the introduction 
of Alex and his gang of “droogs” (Burgess, 7) and we witness a succession of violent 
attacks. As Martin Amis notes, “Alex is so bad and he knows it” (Amis 2012, iv). The 
catchphrase of the gang “what’s it gonna be then, eh?” is a rhetorical ploy; in this 
instance the consistency is gratuitous and brutal violence (“stealing and roughing” 
[Burgess, 18]). Burgess intended this depiction as an indictment of the “feral youth” of 
1950s/1960s society, the growth of youth subcultures such as the Mods and the 
Rockers (Biswell 2012, xvii). This violence is supported by a prominent usage of drugs 
which are portrayed as central to the youth subculture, which also has its own dialect 
(“Nadsat”). In the Korova Milkbar where Alex and his droogs gather to plan their crimes, 
the drinks are spiked with an assortment of drugs, such as “synthemesc” (mescaline) 
and “knives” (amphetamines) (Burgess, 9ff.). But this is not the only backstory as 
Burgess was also fascinated by the apparent complicity between brutalism and high art 
in Nazism. He consequently draws Alex as an evil character (“we were full of, like, evil”) 
with an implausible love of classical music, especially Beethoven. In the film version, the 
love of music described in the book takes on added life on an accompanying soundtrack, 
and the connect between the music and the violence is all the more immediate. But in 
terms of interpretation, the Burgess and Kubrick readings are similar with regard to 
Part 1. This section of the work ends with Alex’s own gang turning against him and 
deserting their leader, allowing him to take the blame for one of the victims dying in 
hospital after one of their malevolent attacks.  
This consistency between Kubrick and Burgess is also present in the depiction of 
Part 2. In Part 2 of the text, violence comes not from below but from above; it is the 
supposedly rehabilitative violence of the state. Having seen out two years of his 
sentence, Alex is selected for reclamation treatment (using what is termed “Ludovico’s 
technique”). This turns out to be a crash course of aversion therapy, using Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony. It is the reading of Part 3 of the text which sees an important difference 
emerge between Burgess and Kubrick. A Clockwork Orange was in fact published with 2 
endings, one which presents Alex as properly rehabilitated and one which sees the 
whole state apparatus of treatment as just as bad as the crime itself. Burgess had added 
the second ending to his original text as a kind of Epilogue but this was not published in 
the American edition of the text (this was the publishers’ decision). “I was cured all 
right” says Alex, in an ironic tone. It is the latter version which Kubrick adopts (the 
version of the novel published in America). But this is where there is a clear ideological 
divergence between Burgess and Kubrick, as for Burgess the first rehabilitative ending 
(described in a final 23rd chapter) is the essential and authentic one. In Burgess’s official 
version of the text, Alex is fully redeemed. He outgrows the violence and immoralism of 
youth, longs to get married and even carries a photo of a baby around with him (“a baby 
gurgling goo goo goo”). It is not coincidental that Burgess was a Christian, in fact on his 
own terms an “Augustinian Catholic” and this is the key to his preferred ending. For 
some commentators such as Amis for example, this “feels like startling loss of nerve on 
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Burgess’s part or a recrudescence of self-punitive religious guilt” (2012: xiii). In 
Kubrick’s filmic example, to the contrary, the final part simply reinforces the reality of 
Alex’s evil, his being bad and knowing his badness in an unapologetic way. In this 
version, the Part 2 process of state rehabilitation is just shown to be itself violent and 
merciless, and also a failure in terms of its supposed goal of inducing normalised 
behaviour and thought.  
Let us take each of our two philosophical questions in turn as they relate to the 
Burgess and Kubrick examples of the text, while keeping this potential philosophical 
divergence in mind. We will see below that Plato’s original Cave allegory already 
implicates both of these philosophical approaches in its depiction of the search for 
existential meaning and truth. 
 
1. Is there a clear demarcation between truth and illusion, or truth and appearance, and 
can we have a knowledge or epistemological foundation for such a distinction?  
At one point of the text, the anti-hero Alex exclaims “It’s funny how the colours of the 
real world only seem really real when you viddy them on the screen” (Burgess, 62). This 
confusion or blurring of the clear distinction between what is real and what only 
appears to be real is a foundational dilemma for Burgess’s text. It seems to have become 
exacerbated as a problem in the twentieth century as human perception must engage 
with so many new media and image-saturated cultures, including television and cinema 
(and more recently the virtualisation of communication in social media). As Martin 
Amis notes in his Foreword to the Penguin edition of the novel, Burgess is projecting 
forward in the early 1960s when some of these media developments had already taken 
place, with a prescient sense that such media would only become ever more dominant 
and overwhelming for human perception. “When in 1960, Anthony Burgess sat down to 
write the novel, he knew that the novel would be set in the near future and that it would 
take the standard science fictional route developing and fiercely exaggerating current 
tendencies” (Amis 2012: vii). 
Alex as a character is right at the heart of this intensification of illusion, not least 
because even his supposed treatment or cure for his destructive behaviour is precisely 
through an exposure to intensely violent imagery, in Part 2’s “Ludovico treatment.” But 
there is also an age-old principle at work here, which develops from Plato’s Allegory, 
and which connects to Burgess’s own Christianity. Part of the punishment for original 
sin in the Christian story is the weakening of our capacity for knowledge; humanity after 
the Fall is doomed to a certain ignorance. Plato’s Cave becomes the post-Fall alienated 
home of every human being. In this, it is impossible to tell the up from the down, the 
good from the bad, in clear or definitive terms.  
The filmic version of the novel adds to this sense of alienation and disconnection 
from truth and belonging. As Robert Hughes notes, “The impression, a very deliberate 
one, is of cultural objects cut loose from any power to communicate or even to be 
noticed; there is no reality to which they connect . . . a vast cultural emptiness” (Hughes 
2003: 131). In such a context of disorientation, it seems as if anything goes and we just 
make up our own truths and values. The opening lines of the novel spoken dramatically 
and didactically by Alex foreground this knowledge and truth vacuum: 
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What’s it going to be then, eh? There was me, that is Alex, and my three droogs, 
that is Pete, Georgie and Dim, Dim being really Dim and we sat in the Korova 
Milkbar making up our rassoodocks what to do with the evening… a flip dark 
chill winter bastard though dry. (Burgess, 7)  
This crucial opening phrase of “what’s it going to be then, eh?” points us to the lack of 
inherent value or orientation in the pre-existing landscape. Moreover, the “making up 
our rassoodocks” phrase indicates that no inherent value seems to be forthcoming and 
thus, that it is left to Alex and his gang to “make up” truth or value. As an opening 
gambit, this is both a challenge to the reader but also a description of late twenty 
century existence, as Burgess sees it.  
This foregrounding of a vacuum (effectively we are in the realm of nihilism) also 
allows for the possibility of a whole new set of values, but here (unlike in Plato’s Cave) it 
is not the philosopher Socrates who comes to rescue us but rather, to the contrary, there 
is no rescue. Rather it is Alex who is presented as the paradigm of the re-evaluator of all 
values, his impetuous and psychotic actions becoming the new criterion for truth 
amongst the youth gangs. In this, Alex and his droogs serve as a microcosm or a 
paradigm for the wider macrocosmic late twentieth century society. As we noted above, 
in Burgess’s original version of the text, this re-evaluation of all values and of truth is 
finally recoverable in a kind of Christian rehabilitation or redemption of Alex the sinner. 
But in Kubrick’s version, Alex seems irredeemable.  
The opening scene, as already described above in the Korova Milkbar, where 
Alex and the droogs, are planning their violence and taking drugs, is intensified in the 
film version. Kubrick’s opening film sequence develops the original narrative in 
significant ways. In the first instance, when Alex refers to the “viddying on the screen” 
as the truly if paradoxically real (Burgess, 62), it is as if he is already anticipating the 
later filmic version. One can contrast the opening scenes of book and film from the point 
of view of the directness or immediacy of the cinema experience. The specific language 
of the dialect Burgess employs (entitled “Nadsat,” which is Russian for “teen”) for his 
youth gangs creates a certain distancing from the textual violence which opens the 
book, but as McDougal notes, “no such distance is available to the film viewer” (2003, 3). 
Thus the cinematic experience creates a greater disorientation than the novel in terms 
of our question of the distinction between “truth” and “illusion.” Because of the lack of 
distance in the opening scenes of the film version, it is far more difficult to tell clearly 
what we should consider “real” and what “illusion.” If we are not as liable as Alex to 
simply invert our usual understanding and to associate the real with “viddying on the 
screen,” nonetheless cinema as a medium allows Kubrick to intensify the original 
epistemological problem in the Burgess text.  
McDougal refers to the specificity of this as creating an apocalyptic “shock” in the 
viewer (3), the latter being one of the reasons for the moral panic surrounding the film 
release and its various issues with distribution. Kubrick himself decided to remove the 
film from distribution in the UK in the 1970s due to adverse publicity and it was only 
officially re-released after his death. In many other countries, various issues were raised 
to limit its availability (for example, in Ireland, it was banned by the state censor for 
over twenty years). Again, the distinction between “truth” and “illusion” is relevant 
here, as it was precisely the emergence of copycat killings, caused by a very real 
identification with the illusory violence of the film, which led to the outcry and 
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subsequent distribution issues. Jay Cocks refers to this aspect of the film as “chillingly 
and often hilariously believable” (quoted in Hughes 2003, 131). As McDougal outlines, 
the purposeful cinematography and use of contrived film sets for this section of the film 
were all part of the artist’s vision. “The film begins with the striking image of Alex de 
Large (Malcolm McDowell) seated on a banquette in the Korova milkbar... The camera 
pills back to reveal the milkbar in all its splendour. This is one of the few sets created for 
the film and the sculptures of nude women forming tables and milk dispensers establish 
an extremely disturbing tone for the film” (McDougal 2003, 4). The extraordinary 
performance of McDowell in the film also adds to the character’s impact on the viewer, 
although as we shall see below, this may also be due to a certain reinterpretation of the 
text by Kubrick in terms of its overall vision and purpose. 
From questions of knowledge and epistemology (or the complete lack thereof) 
we are thus led very quickly to questions of ethics, concerns of good and evil. Indeed, 
this is precisely where the supposed different interpretation between Burgess and 
Kubrick comes to the fore. Let us reiterate our second main question, outlined above.  
 
2. Is there a clear distinction between good and evil? What sense can we make of the 
attractiveness of evil, if good is an acknowledged superior value? 
Burgess’s Christianity serves also as a background ideology to his depiction of the battle 
between good and evil in A Clockwork Orange. As Amis notes in his Foreword (2012), 
one of the first themes Burgess was clear on in the novel was that it was going to 
concern the relation between “good and bad, and the question of free will” (of course, 
these are perennial Christian concerns after Augustine). While in this sense the figure of 
Alex can be seen as replaying traditional concerns, nonetheless his specificity (as well as 
historical particularity) is shown by Burgess through the employment of an “argot or 
idiolect that the world had never heard before” (Amis 2012, viii). Moreover, some of the 
post-war concerns about the complicity of High Art and Nazism are exemplified in 
Alex’s “highly implausible passion; an ecstatic love of classical music. . . Beethoven and 
Birkenau didn’t merely co-exist; they combined and colluded” (ibid). Thus, Alex’s 
sociopathy (played so well in the film version by Malcolm McDowell) is all the more 
complex for its sophistication, or its juxtaposition of basic instinct with high culture.  
The novel is set in a vaguely socialist future (roughly the late seventies or early 
eighties) in a dreary England, where teenage gangs terrorise at night. The novel was 
purported to have been inspired by a trip Burgess made to Russia with his wife, where 
he encountered the same amoral and lawless gangs of Mods and Rockers he was 
familiar with from late fifties England (this explains the idiosyncratic dialect Nadsat, 
derived from Russian, which the youths speak). Kael describes the object of study of the 
novel (with Alex as the paradigmatic leader) as “amoral youth gangs” (Kael 2003, 134) 
and their “destructive potential.” In the figure of Alex as Burgess depicts him, we would 
thus seem to have a clear example of “evil.” 
But matters are complexified in the novel by the fact that the oppositional forces 
to the youth gangs—the state, the police, the psychiatrists—are also part of the 
problem. The “clockwork orange” of the title refers to the problem of conditioned 
morality; “this leads into criticism of the government that robotised him; turned him 
into a clockwork orange” (Kael, 135). If Alex is a villain, his treatment at the hands of the 
moralistic state shows up the state forces of supposed good to be on an equivalent level 
Irwin: A Clockwork Orange as a Philosophical-Literary Platonic Fable 
 
Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy  Vol. 4: 2021 
 
7 
to Alex and his thugs. If as Kael suggests the “ironies are protean here” (and the 
ambiguities multiplied) nonetheless there is a clear message that a “society turned 
clockwork orange” can be no moral solution to the dilemma of amoral youth. Rather this 
itself is a horror: “Burgess is clearly a humanist; his point of view is that of a Christian 
horrified by the possibilities of a society turned clockwork orange, in which life is so 
mechanised that men lose their capacity for moral choice” (Kael, 135). 
Kael argues persuasively that the original novel presents a critique of a 
mechanised society where we have all become “clockwork oranges,” whether we act 
morally or immorally. Burgess would be arguing against the determinations of our 
choices and freedoms by contemporary socialisation, but also arguing for our 
responsibility in seeking to foster the re-emergence of such freedoms as an existential 
task (Kael, 134ff.). If we do not rediscover and reassert our freedoms, we will enter 
what Robert Hughes refers to as “the décor of tomorrow’s Hell” (Hughes 2003, 131), 
completely dehumanised and incapable of discriminating between the best or the worst 
of actions.  
Robert Hughes sees both the textual and filmic versions of the book as congruent 
in this ethical vision (although he does not discuss their different textual versions). The 
state treatment of Alex is indicted in not simply turning Alex against violence but also as 
a conditioning which works against his love of music, most especially his love of 
“Ludwig van’ Beethoven.” Burgess is once again thematising the complicity possible 
between “evil” and “good,” the latter here associated for the author with classical music 
(Amis 2012). There is also a possible connection here back to Plato’s critique of art in 
The Republic, where he warns of the dangers of alienation involved in the representative 
arts, and Socrates calls for the banishment of the artist from the ideal Republic. Hughes 
reads the Kubrick style as extending the Burgess point, allowing for an ethics to emerge 
contra evil, even in the very aesthetic approach which Kubrick takes to the making of 
the detail of the film: “Kubrick delivers these insights with something of Alex’s pure 
consistent aggression. His visual style is swift and cold, appropriately even necessarily 
so. Moreover his direction has the rarest of qualities, bravura morality – ironic, precise 
and ferocious” (Hughes 2003, 132).  
Thus as both Hughes and Kael present the novel, what emerges is a counter-
cultural ethics which is also expressed in a complex and sophisticated aesthetics. Both 
Alex and his youth gangs on the one side, and the totalitarian state on the other, are 
seen as manifestations of evil, while the good can only emerge in their mutual critique; 
but this critique (in order to engage the complexity of the problem) cannot be linear or 
didactic—rather it must be “ironic and precise.” We might say that in both Burgess and 
Kubrick, the problems are much more clearly described and evoked than the solutions, 
which remain sketchily or “ironically” suggested. Both as an ethical and aesthetic 
problem, the manifest evils of contemporary society belie easy remedy. Thus, questions 
remain as to the predicament of art in this situation. Certain kinds of contemporary art 
are vehemently critiqued in the texts, as already suggested. “The impression, a very 
deliberate one, is of cultural objects cut loose from any power to communicate or even 
to be noticed; there is no reality to which they connect . . . a vast cultural emptiness” 
(Hughes 2003, 131). Significantly, Kael even goes so far as to indict Kubrick’s aesthetic 
approach as fundamentally failing to translate the humanistic ethical vision of the 
original novel.  
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On Kael’s perspective, Burgess succeeds in employing a complex literary art to 
develop the ethical and philosophical questions even if the solution remains “ironic” or 
nondidactic. In this, Burgess would seem to have succeeded in overcoming the Platonic 
dilemma regarding art and truth, as outlined in the Republic. Of course, for Plato, no 
such resolution was possible and, at least as understood literally, he seeks to banish the 
artist from the polis. In the case of Burgess’s literary art, to the contrary, art and truth, 
literature and philosophy are seen to co-operate successfully. However, this is a 
complex predicament for literature and for cinema and while we saw above how 
Hughes vindicates the cinema version of Kubrick’s for its “bravura morality,” Kael sees 
the cinematic example as succumbing to the pitfalls of the Platonic dilemma. Kubrick’s 
cinematic example remains caught within the prison house of the Cave. Of course, 
considering the different textual versions used by Burgess and Kubrick as described 
above, this is hardly a surprising distinct end result. By omitting the original ending, and 
opting for Text 2, Kubrick would seem to be consciously eschewing a redemptive or 
happy ending.  
Already on the philosophical level of hermeneutics and meaning, according to 
Kael, Kubrick’s film changes the claim; he can be said to invert Burgess’s thesis. In 
Kubrick’s contemporary world, the questions of “what is truth?”, “what is good as 
opposed to evil?” and “what is authentic freedom?” are also at issue. But whereas, for 
Burgess, the anti-hero Alex becomes an example of how society “has lost its soul,” in 
Kubrick’s vision Alex becomes a hero, “pitted against society”; “the movie becomes a 
vindication of Alex, saying that the punk was a free human being and only the good Alex 
was a robot” (Kael 2003, 134ff.). Thus freedom in this latter instance becomes identified 
with a kind of “hyperviolence,” a destructive form of anarchism precisely pitted against 
the form of humanism which Burgess’s original novel seemed to espouse.  
We might return to Alex’s question to the reader, which kicks off A Clockwork 
Orange: “what’s it going to be then, eh?” On Kael’s view, Burgess and Kubrick actually 
give us very different interpretations of what our answer to this question should be. If 
Burgess opts for an ethics which might emerge in the mutual critique of contemporary 
self and society, Kubrick rather presents us with an affirmation of Alex as hero and 
nihilist, reinventing values in accordance with his own vision of radical and violent 
freedom. On Hughes’s terms, to add a further complication, the artistic and 
philosophical visions of Burgess and Kubrick are actually distinct but consistent; they 
both offer the humanistic third way. While each of the interpretations has something to 
offer, nonetheless it is clear that the different textual versions used by the literary and 
film versions are highly significant here. In this. Kael’s reading of the ultimate 
antagonism between Burgess and Kubrick seems more persuasive. It is interesting that 
in later theatre versions of the text, adapted by Burgess himself, Kubrick was often 
introduced as a character who would then be run off the stage by Alex and the droogs 
(Biswell 2012, xii). It seems clear that Burgess remained unconvinced by Kubrick’s 
filmic reinterpretation of his original literary work. 
Conclusion – No Futures Are Inevitable 
If we return to the original allegory, which we see as structuring the dilemmas played 
out in the text of Burgess and the cinema of Kubrick, we can note that its own 
resolutions are far from being unproblematic. If Plato’s Allegory is intended (along with 
the Sun and the Line analogy and simile [Plato 508–514]) to clarify the understanding 
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and justification for the theory of forms, it hardly succeeds in this task in any 
straightforward manner (Annas 1981, 250ff). Rather, as Annas has shown, the Cave 
story tempts us to ask questions which are unanswerable within the limits of the 
imagery. Similarly, Annas cites the Platonist Iris Murdoch warning of the “blazingly 
strong imagery . . . which can obstruct the understanding” (Annas, 252). There are 
strong connections in our analysis of A Clockwork Orange, both in its literary and 
cinematic versions, back to Plato’s original depiction. As with Plato and the Socratic 
example, once more we have at issue questions of knowledge and truth on the one side 
and questions of ethics and self-knowledge on the other. As with the early Greeks, 
questions of moral conduct are dovetailed with questions of epistemology in a manner 
which highlights their inter-dependence. How can we know if Alex is a villain or a hero? 
How can we know whether the state treatment of evil is either a moral remedy or part 
of the problem? The differences between the text and film versions of this hermeneutic 
show up the complexity of interpretation involved. 
However, Kael’s strong avowal of Burgess’s novel and her complete disavowal of 
Kubrick’s cinematic example seem rather exaggerated and overly dualistic, even if her 
reading of the conflict between Burgess and Kubrick is persuasive. She already notes in 
her review of the film that the “ironies are protean” (Kael, 137) but of course, these 
ironies are already present in Burgess’s novel. It is as if Annas and Murdoch, in noting 
the risk taking of Plato’s textual craft, were to dismiss his entire Republic as a result. 
Instead, both Annas and Murdoch contextualise the ambiguity of the Allegory within a 
wider philosophical project of Plato’s to draw us towards a complex and difficult set of 
human truths. This is also what Robert Hughes does in looking at a comparison between 
Burgess and Kubrick. He notes how Kubrick’s style mimics a certain aggression in the 
character of Alex, but unlike Kael, he reads this aesthetic as being “appropriate even 
necessary” (Hughes, 132). This is because Kubrick’s morality is “bravura…ironic, precise 
and ferocious” (ibid).  
We might make the comparison with Plato. Why did he include the Allegory of 
the Cave in the Republic when it runs the risk of ambiguity and confusion? Why cite the 
exiling of the artist from the Republic when this appears contradictory to his own 
employment of artistic means? Perhaps the answer lies in Kubrick’s approach which 
itself translates Burgess’s literature. If we want to offer a critique of not simply Alex but 
also of the government’s inverted-Beethoven techniques, we require a courageous type 
of ethics. This ethics must be “bravura,” it must be “ironic and precise.” It must combine 
the resources of philosophy and “science”-fiction, of metaphysics and art, often in a risk-
taking manner so as to subvert the conventionalities of common or complacent morality 
(better understood as narrow “moralism"). Perhaps the last irony in this story is that 
Plato was precisely already practising this hybrid art in 2500 BC—in this, his work 
shows an extraordinary sophistication and prescience. Furthermore, his descendants 
are not always so readily apparent in contemporary philosophy, which often has 
become so specialised as to disallow recourse to other forms of expression or 
representation. In this, contemporary philosophy often seems indeed to have banished 
the artist from the polis. Who, for example, writes today in the form of philosophical 
dialogue? However, if there is a lack of Platonic dialogue, there are honourable 
exceptions to a hybridity in philosophical approaches and styles. Perhaps the 
existentialist thinkers of the twentieth century are the most powerful example of 
philosophers who sought to render their philosophy in literature, poetry and film as 
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well as in more rationally argued treatises (for example, the counterpoint between 
Sartre’s novel Nausea and his treatise Being and Nothingness). 
Thankfully, there are other thinkers and writers working outside professional 
philosophy who can be seen as developing some of Plato’s hybrid aesthetic in significant 
and provocative ways. In this essay, we have explored the examples of Burgess and 
Kubrick, who like Plato, place the need for a “bravura morality” at the heart of their 
work but do this slantwise, in addressing the ever more convoluted dimensions of 
knowledge and ignorance, good and evil, in our contemporary epoch. If as Hughes 
warns us, we wish to avoid living within “the décor of tomorrow’s hell,” and if also “no 
futures are inevitable” (Hughes, 132), we would do well to see Plato’s original mythic-
philosophical vision and the literary-philosophical expression of Burgess and Kubrick as 
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